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THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS: FAIRNESS AND
UNCERTAINTY IN AN ERA OF BIOLOGIC
PHARMACEUTICALS
ABSTRACT
Research in the rapidly developing area of biologic pharmaceuticals
promises to improve the lives of millions of patients suffering from disorders
that were, until very recently, untreatable. The staggering potential market for
such treatments has attracted enormous investment from the pharmaceutical
industry, with a concomitant increase in related patent disputes. This
investment, coupled with proposed legislation that would pave the way for the
creation of “follow-on” biologic treatments via a statutory pathway similar to
the one created for generic pharmaceuticals by the Hatch–Waxman legislation
of the early 1980s, should ensure that the number of patent disputes involving
biologic pharmaceuticals will continue to rise dramatically in the coming
years.
This Comment focuses on the patent law concept known as the doctrine of
equivalents, and observes that the very complexity that makes biologic
pharmaceuticals so valuable for treating previously untreatable disorders also
creates difficulties in the field of patent law, particularly when the doctrine of
equivalents is involved. This Comment notes that there is considerable
evidence that juries have difficulty dealing with cases involving technologically
advanced subject matter of the type that is often at issue in biologics cases, and
discusses illustrative cases involving the doctrine of equivalents. This
Comment also argues that the doctrine of equivalents increases the uncertainty
of the scope of biologic patents. This uncertainty has the potential to chill vital
biologics innovation in a way that often cannot be overcome by such remedies
as cross-licensing. Finally, this Comment proposes solutions to these
problems, including the judicious application of legal limitations on the
doctrine of equivalents in biologics cases, the impaneling of expert juries that
are able to better understand the complex issues involved in such cases, and
the denial of injunctive relief in biologics cases where infringement is found
under the doctrine of equivalents.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, at a local hospital, a patient consulted with her doctor about a
problem with her vision. This patient was most likely in her fifties or sixties,
and complained of symptoms such as difficulty reading before bed, trouble
adjusting to dim light after entering a room from the outside, an inability to
perceive fine detail, and blurring of her central visual fields.1 Her symptoms
were classic indicators of age-related macular degeneration (AMD), a
progressive blinding disease that is the leading cause of blindness in
individuals fifty years and older, the primary blinding disorder in developed
countries, and the third leading cause of blindness worldwide.2 As recently as
2007, her physician would have had few treatment options to offer.3 Today,
however, her physician is able to prescribe a simple series of monthly
injections that may not only prevent her vision loss, but could actually improve
her visual acuity.4
The vision of this patient, and thousands of others like her, is being
preserved by a drug called Lucentis, which the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approved for treatment of AMD in 1996.5 To date, Lucentis is the most
effective treatment for AMD and is also one of the more expensive medicines
on the market, costing around $1,950 per treatment.6 Lucentis is not a
traditional chemical pharmaceutical, but rather a fragment of a humanized
antibody, which when injected into the eye inhibits the action of a protein

1 R.E. Hogg & U. Chakravarthy, Visual Function and Dysfunction in Early and Late Age-Related
Maculopathy, 25 PROGRESS RETINAL & EYE RES. 249, 252 (2006).
2 Luis Javier Hernandez-Pastor et al., Ranibizumab for Neovascular Age-Related Macular
Degeneration, 65 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 1805, 1805 (2008).
3 See Michael Waisbourd et al., Targeting Vascular Endothelial Growth Factor: A Promising Strategy
for Treating Age-Related Macular Degeneration, 24 DRUGS & AGING 643 (2007) (providing an early
description of AMD treatments involving the inhibition of vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF)).
4 See Edwin M. Stone, A Very Effective Treatment for Neovascular Macular Degeneration, 355 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1493, 1494 (2006).
5 Id. Lucentis is the brand name for Ranibizumab, which is a recombinant, humanized version of a
fragment of a mouse antibody. See Waisbourd et al., supra note 3, at 650–54.
6 Robert Steinbrook, The Price of Sight—Ranibizumab, Bevacizumab, and the Treatment of Macular
Degeneration, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1409, 1409 (2006). Indeed, it has been estimated that it would cost over
$50,000 “to prevent one patient with predominantly classic neovascular AMD from losing visual acuity over a
12-month period.” Hernandez-Pastor et al., supra note 2, at 1812 (describing the pharmacoeconomics of
Ranibizumab treatment for AMD). Lucentis sales for 2009 totaled $2.34 billion dollars in revenue. R&D
PIPELINE NEWS, LA MERIE BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE, TOP 20 BIOLOGICS 2009, at 2 (2010),
http://www.pipelinereview.com/free-downloads/top_20_biologics_2009_rd_pipeline_news.pdf..
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responsible for the formation of new blood vessels.7 As such, Lucentis
represents a very successful example of a relatively new class of
pharmaceuticals called biologics, which the FDA defines as comprising “a
wide range of products such as vaccines, blood and blood components,
allergenics, somatic cells, gene therapy, tissues, and recombinant therapeutic
proteins.”8 Sales of biologics totaled around $80 billion in 2008, accounting
for more than 10% of global pharmaceutical sales.9 Recognizing the growth
and importance of this class of pharmaceuticals,10 Congress recently passed the
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009,11 which is intended
to facilitate the development of generic, or “follow-on,” biologics,12 in much
the same way that the Hatch–Waxman Act of 1982 led to the widespread
availability of generic versions of brand-name pharmaceuticals.13

7 Stone, supra note 4, at 1493. The antibody binds to and inhibits the protein VEGF, which is
responsible for neovascularization (the induction of new blood vessel growth). Id. Ranibizumab was initially
developed as an anti-tumor therapeutic for cancer patients (inhibiting neovascularization retards tumor
growth), but has recently become a widely prescribed treatment for the “wet” form of AMD, which is caused
by neovascularization in the eye. Id. at 1493–94; see also Waisbourd et al., supra note 3 (describing further
the use of Ranibizumab for treating AMD).
8 Consumers (Biologics), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
ResourcesforYou/Consumers/default.htm (last updated Sept. 28, 2010). See generally Ronald A. Rader,
(Re)defining Biopharmaceutical, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 743 (2008).
9 R&D PIPELINE NEWS, LA MERIE BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE, TOP 20 BIOLOGICS 2008, at 2 (2009),
http://www.pipelinereview.com/free-downloads/TOP_20_Biologics_2008_in_RD_Pipeline_News.pdf. Global
pharmaceutical sales totaled around $770 billion in 2008. Krishan Maggon, Global Pharmaceutical Market
Review & World Top Ten/Twenty Drugs 2008, KNOL.GOOGLE.COM, http://knol.google.com/k/globalpharmaceutical-market-review-world-top-ten-twenty-drugs-2008 (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
10 It has been predicted that biologics will surpass sales of traditional pharmaceuticals by 2014. Biotech
Set to Dominate Drug Industry Growth, EVALUATEPHARMA (June 17, 2009), http://www.evaluatepharma.com/
Universal/View.aspx?type=Story&id=188700&sectionID=&isEPVantage=yes; see also Andrew Pollack,
Costly Drugs Known as Biologics Prompt Exclusivity Debate, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009, at B1 (documenting
the legislative push for biosimilars legislation as a cost-saving measure commensurate with the overall goals of
health care reform).
11 Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. VII, 124 Stat. 804 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–262). The Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act was part of the much larger Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at 20, 21, 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
12 In the pharmaceutical industry, a “pioneer” or “brand-name” drug is a drug that is the first of its kind
on the market, while a “follow-on” drug applies to generics that are subsequently created and marketed. In the
case of biologics, pioneer biologics like Lucentis may be followed by generic versions that would be termed
follow-on biologics, biosimilars, or generic biologics. Sanya Sukduang & Jonathan Davies, Follow-On
Biologics: A Patent Litigation Perspective, PHARMACEUTICAL COM. (Aug. 22, 2009), http://www.
pharmaceuticalcommerce.com/frontEnd/1262-Follow_on_Biologics:_APatentLitigationPerspective.html; see
also Megan Thisse, Working the Bugs Out of Biologics: A Look at the Access to Life-Saving Medicines Act and
Follow-On Biologics, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 543, 543 n.1 (2008).
13 The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also referred to as the Hatch–
Waxman Act, amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, outlining the approval process used for modern
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The popularity of biologic pharmaceuticals, as well as incentives present in
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, should encourage the
development of generic follow-on versions of pioneer biologics; accordingly,
the future will likely see increased litigation over the patent rights protecting
biologic pharmaceuticals.14 As a result, courts will be forced to resolve
questions of validity and infringement with respect to patents involving rapidly
evolving, cutting-edge therapeutics, and may be hard-pressed to apply
traditional doctrines of patent law to such a novel and complex class of
technology. One such traditional doctrine of patent law is the doctrine of
equivalents.
This Comment argues that the doctrine of equivalents substantially
broadens patent scope when applied to disputes involving biologics patents,
which could chill innovation in an area of vital interest to the public. Part I of
this Comment provides a brief description of patent law concepts, with
particular attention to the historical development of the doctrine of equivalents.
Part II explores the difficulties that can be encountered when courts attempt to
apply the doctrine of equivalents in a biologics context, and briefly discusses
two recent cases that illustrate these difficulties. Part III argues that
application of the doctrine in such situations should be limited for two reasons:
first, because juries have difficulty deciding technologically complex cases,
and second, because the uncertainty inherent in the doctrine’s application
exerts a chilling effect upon biologics innovation, which cannot be effectively
addressed through remedies such as cross-licensing. Finally, Part IV of this
Comment explores several proposals for limiting the use of the doctrine of

generic pharmaceuticals. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 § 505, 21
U.S.C. § 355 (2006).
14 For example, in 2004, over half of the abbreviated new drug applications (or ANDAs, which are a type
of patent application allowed for generic drugs under the Hatch–Waxman Act) filed by Teva Pharmaceuticals
were “Paragraph IV filings,” in which Teva essentially initiated litigation with a pioneer drug patent holder by
preemptively challenging any claims of infringement asserted by the pioneer patent holder. See Michelle L.
Kirsche, Best May Be Yet to Come for Generic Drug Makers, DRUG STORE NEWS (Feb. 14, 2005), available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3374/is_2_27/ai_n10018295/. With the potential for huge profits,
manufacturers of follow-on biologics can be expected to initiate similar litigation if allowed to do so under
future legislation. In the absence of such legislation, litigation may arise over attempts by follow-on
manufacturers to “design around” existing biologics patents. See Robert N. Sahr, The Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act: Innovation Must Come Before Price Competition, 2009 B.C. INTELL. PROP.
& TECH. F. 070201, 45–47 (discussing the impact on biologics innovation of follow-on products that “design
around” existing biologics patents); see also David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and
Legal Issues Relevant to Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based
Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 168–72 (2005) (reviewing the Hatch–
Waxman legislation and the prospects of similar legislation for biologics); Thisse, supra note 12.

WHITE GALLEYSFINAL

756

4/5/2011 10:53 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60

equivalents to overly broaden biologics patent rights, including legal
limitations on the doctrine, the use of specialized juries to aid in resolving
technologically complex biologics cases, and the denial of injunctions (thus
mandating compulsory licenses) as a remedy for infringement in biologics
cases involving the doctrine of equivalents.
I. PATENTS, INFRINGEMENT, AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
Patents exist to provide an incentive for inventors to innovate.15 This
incentive comes in the form of a limited monopoly that allows the patentee to
prevent others from engaging in certain uses of the patented invention.16 In
return for this monopoly, the patent holder must make the details of the
invention public, allowing others to study its workings and (hopefully) use the
knowledge gained to develop further innovations.17 Patents may therefore be
understood as a delicately balanced set of rights in which a patentee is granted
the “right to exclude” others from certain uses of her invention,18 but only to
the extent that this encourages the spread of new ideas and inventions to the
public as a whole.19 This Part begins by briefly reviewing basic patent law
concepts and continues on to a more specific discussion of the doctrine of
equivalents and its history.
In the United States, a patent consists of a written specification describing
the patented invention followed by a list of claims delineating specific

15 Beidler v. United States, 253 U.S. 447, 453 (1920) (“[A] correct and adequate description or disclosure
of a claimed discovery . . . is essential to the validity of a patent, for the reason that such a disclosure is
necessary in order to give the public the benefit of the invention after the patent shall expire.”).
16 Currently, this protection begins on the day the patent issues and ends twenty years after the filing date
of the patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
17 See Beidler, 253 U.S. at 453. Although the courts stress this quid pro quo view of patents, the classic
academic justification is that patents are “needed to counter the public good nature of information.” See
Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 125, 132 (2006) (discussing the public
good problem and arguing that disclosure requirements are actually more important for demonstrating
possession of an invention—and therefore the right to a patent—than for teaching the public about the
invention); see also Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) (criticizing ex post justifications for patent rights, such as downstream coordination or
improvement of inventions, in favor of ex ante justifications that view patents as combating the public good
problem).
18 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852).
19 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (“The Patent Clause itself
reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle
competition . . . .”).
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elements of the invention that the inventor desires to patent.20 Patents do not
grant the patent holder a positive right to practice the invention, but rather the
right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or
importing the patented invention.21 A patent holder who believes that another
party has violated the rights described above may, among other things, initiate
legal proceedings against that party with an infringement action.22 If
successful, such an action can result in a court order enjoining the infringing
party from practicing the patented invention, an award of damages payable by
the infringing party to the patent holder, or both.23 In defending against an
action for infringement, the accused infringer will generally attempt either to
show that the allegedly infringed patent is invalid, or to demonstrate that her
actions did not actually infringe the patent in question.24
To determine if an accused invention indeed infringes upon the patent in
question, a court will first engage in the process of claim construction, in
which it determines as a matter of law the scope of the claims at issue,
attempting to define their limits as would a person having ordinary skill in the
art at the time of the claim’s filing.25 After the claims have been properly
construed, infringement analysis involves a factual comparison of the claims at
issue to the accused invention, which is a matter for the fact-finder.26 To
literally infringe a patent, the accused invention must be identical to each
element of one of the claims at issue.27

20 See generally CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 39 (2008) (describing the patent
application). Patent law is codified by the statutes collected in Title 35 of the U.S. Code, which were passed
(and may be modified) by Congress under its constitutional authority “[t]o promote the Progress of the Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
21 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); see also Bloomer, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 549.
22 35 U.S.C. § 281. Generic drug manufacturers may preemptively initiate such litigation through a
Paragraph IV filing of an abbreviated new drug application. See Elizabeth H. Dickinson, FDA’s Role in
Making Exclusivity Determinations, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 195, 197–99 (1999) (summarizing this process).
23 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 283, 284.
24 Id. § 282.
25 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996) (“Victory in an infringement suit
requires a finding that the patent claim ‘covers the alleged infringer’s product or process,’ which in turn
necessitates a determination of ‘what the words in the claim mean.’” (quoting HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT
LAW AND PRACTICE 80 (2d ed. 1995))).
26 Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
27 Southwall Tech., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (1995) (“To establish literal
infringement, every limitation set forth in a claim must be found in the accused product, exactly.”). An
invention that literally infringes each limitation of a claim is said to “read on” the claim. Id.
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Yet even if an accused invention does not literally infringe a claim, the
accused infringer may still be liable for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.28 The doctrine of equivalents is a concept in patent law that
originated to prevent “the unscrupulous copyist [from making] unimportant
and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent which, though adding
nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim, and
hence outside the reach of the law.”29 The doctrine of equivalents has existed
since the early nineteenth century, before the establishment of patent claims as
they are known today.30 Without specific claims to follow, juries of the time
used what some scholars have described as a “substantiality” test to determine
infringement, comparing the written description found in the patent to the
accused infringing invention.31 Ultimately, this type of analysis proved
unsatisfactory, as the lack of specificity in patent drafting often made it unclear
where a patent holder’s rights ended and a fellow inventor’s began.32
Attempting to bring clarity and security to patent law, patent lawyers and trial
courts developed what is now considered the modern form of claiming, the
procedures for which were ultimately codified in 1836.33 Yet even though
courts recognized the advantages of a more specific claiming system that
clearly delineated the breadth of patent protection, they often balked at being
forced to rule against patent holders in cases where a patented invention had

28

See NARD, supra note 20, at 435–36 (providing a basic description of infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents, accompanied by selected cases).
29 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (“One who seeks to pirate
an invention . . . may be expected to introduce minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy. [Exact]
duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement. To prohibit no other would place the inventor at the
mercy of verbalism and . . . would deprive him of the benefit of his invention and would foster concealment
rather than disclosure of inventions, which is one of the primary purposes of the patent system.”).
30 See NARD, supra note 20, at 435–36. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property,
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 796 (2009) (exploring intellectual property claiming practice in light of “taxonomical,
descriptive, and normative features,” and suggesting ways to optimize the patent claiming system); Joshua D.
Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future, (1790–1870) (pt. 1), 87 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371 (2005) (summarizing the early history of the doctrine of equivalents).
31 See, e.g., NARD, supra note 20, at 435.
32 See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents,
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 308–10 (describing the patent claim as “an innovation of patent
attorneys . . . formulated to protect and to expand the rights of patentees”). Patents are granted for the sole
purpose of promoting discovery and invention. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This goal is furthered by a
patent system that encourages specificity in the disclosure of patented inventions. See SmithKline Beecham
Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that claims should “reasonably
apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention” (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
314 F.3d 1313, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
33 See Duffy, supra note 32 at 306–16; Sarnoff, supra note 30, at 399.
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clearly been copied, but without any literal infringement of its patent claims.34
To rectify such perceived injustices, courts turned to the doctrine of
equivalents.35
Interestingly, Congress has never officially sanctioned the doctrine of
equivalents; the Patent Act, read literally, limits patent protection to the scope
of the patent claims.36 Accordingly, prior to 1950, the Supreme Court
“consistently limited the doctrine of equivalents under the 1870 Patent Act to
the scope of application of constructed claim language.”37 However, all of this
changed following the Supreme Court’s decision in Graver Tank &
Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.38 In that case, the Court upheld
the lower court’s ruling that, under the doctrine of equivalents, a welding
composition containing manganese infringed a patent claiming welding
compositions containing magnesium.39 Stating that “[i]t is difficult to conceive
of a case more appropriate for application of the doctrine of equivalents,” the
Court ruled that although “infringement was not literal, the changes which
avoid literal infringement are colorable only.”40 The Court in Graver Tank
also stood by the “function-way-result” test developed in prior decisions,
holding that infringement could be established under the doctrine of
equivalents when an infringing device copied a patented invention so as to
“perform[] substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
obtain the same result.”41 This decision is famous not only as the Court’s most
significant pronouncement to date regarding the doctrine of equivalents, but
also for the vigorous dissent authored by Justice Black, in which he argued

34 Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of Protection for Patents After the Supreme Court’s Warner-Jenkinson
Decision: The Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 6–7
(1998). This tension between the need for specificity in patent claiming to satisfy the “public notice” function
of patents and the desire to protect patent holders from inequities due to overly stringent claim interpretations
has been termed the “Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
35 Indeed, as Judge Learned Hand observed, courts “resort to the ‘doctrine of equivalents’ to temper
unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of the invention.” Royal Typewriter Co. v.
Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948).
36 Sarnoff, supra note 30, at 373.
37 Id.; see also Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the
Future: (1870–1952) (pt. 2), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 441 (2005) (providing continued
discussion of the history of the modern doctrine of equivalents).
38 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 612.
41 Id. at 608; see also Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929); Machine Co. v.
Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877).
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against the doctrine of equivalents, emphasizing the importance of the notice
function of patent claims.42
Nearly fifty years later, the Supreme Court outlined the modern doctrine of
equivalents in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., affirming
its decision in Graver Tank by holding that “a product or process that does not
literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be
found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the accused
product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.”43
However, the Supreme Court recognized that after Graver Tank, courts had
perhaps been too eager in applying the doctrine of equivalents in patent cases,
and that this to some extent could defeat the notice function of patents.44 To
guard against this, the Court limited the application of the doctrine by outlining
the “all-elements” rule, mandating that equivalence be determined by
comparing the claimed invention with the accused infringing device on an
element-by-element basis, rather than by comparing the claimed invention to
the accused device as a whole.45 Additionally, the Court held that the doctrine
was not limited to equivalents disclosed in the patent specification, and that
infringement analysis under the doctrine of equivalents is measured at the time
of the alleged infringement rather than, as is the case with literal infringement,
at the time the patent was issued.46
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the question of the doctrine of
equivalents in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.47 In
Festo, the Court again affirmed its support for the doctrine of equivalents by
rejecting an en banc Federal Circuit ruling that made prosecution history
estoppel a complete bar to the doctrine’s application.48 Prosecution history
estoppel arises when, during patent prosecution, the patentee makes a
narrowing amendment to the patent claims to avoid rejection by the patent

42 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 612 (Black, J., dissenting). Arguing that “[w]hat is not specifically claimed
is dedicated to the public,” id. at 614, Justice Black’s criticisms have echoed through the years, outlining the
heart of the continued debate over application of the doctrine of equivalents.
43 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997).
44 The Court stated that it “share[d] the concern . . . that the doctrine of equivalents, as it has come to be
applied since Graver Tank, has taken on a life of its own, unbounded by . . . patent claims,” and also observed
that “[t]here can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the
definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement.” Id. at 28–29.
45 Id. at 29.
46 Id. at 37.
47 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
48 Id.
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examiner.49 In such a situation, courts often will not allow the patentee to later
claim the surrendered subject matter through the use of the doctrine of
equivalents.50 Over time, the Federal Circuit began to view prosecution history
estoppel as an increasingly inflexible barrier to the application of the doctrine
of equivalents, culminating in its Festo decision, in which the court held that a
patentee who surrendered subject matter during patent prosecution was
completely barred from later using the doctrine of equivalents to claim that
same subject matter.51 However, the Supreme Court rejected this approach,
holding that prosecution history instead created a rebuttable presumption
against application of the doctrine of equivalents that could be overcome by
the patentee in certain situations.52
II. BIOLOGICS AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS: TWO ILLUSTRATIVE
CASES
As discussed in the previous Part, the doctrine of equivalents evolved to
prevent “unscrupulous copyists”53 from avoiding patent infringement by
making insubstantial changes to a patented invention that take it outside the
literal scope of the patent’s claims. In doing so, courts have recognized that
patent claims are made up of words, which “are not always the optimal
medium for conveying inventive concepts.”54 The persistence of the doctrine
of equivalents reflects the desire of courts to ensure that the scope of patent
protection is broad enough to remain an incentive for inventors to publicly
disclose their innovations.55 However, as Professor Donald Chisum has noted,
49 “The process of applying for a patent is called patent prosecution, and the record of the prosecution
proceedings before the PTO is called the prosecution history (sometimes referred to as file history).” NARD,
supra note 20, at 37. Narrowing amendments are modifications to the patent application that narrow the scope
of the claims, often to overcome an examiner’s rejection. Id. at 38.
50 See, e.g., Festo, 535 U.S. at 733–34 (“When . . . the patentee originally claimed the subject matter
alleged to infringe but then narrowed the claim in response to a rejection, he may not argue that the
surrendered territory comprised unforeseen subject matter that should be deemed equivalent to the literal
claims of the issued patent.”).
51 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated, 535
U.S. 722 (2002).
52 Festo, 535 U.S. at 737–41. “When the patentee has chosen to narrow a claim, courts may
presume . . . that the territory surrendered is not an equivalent of the territory claimed. In those instances,
however, the patentee still might rebut the presumption that estoppel bars a claim of equivalence.” Id. at 741.
53 See supra note 29.
54 JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 352 (3d ed. 2009); see also Chisum, supra note 34, at 7 (“Claims
are often written by people with limited resources and time, imperfect expression skills, and incomplete
understandings of the invention, the prior art that determines its patentability, and the forms in which it may
later be cast.”).
55 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
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the desire to provide patentees a “fair scope of protection” comes at the price
of creating at least some uncertainty as to the scope of patent protection “that
may deter legitimate investment and business activities.”56 This Part argues
that the doctrine of equivalents is particularly difficult to apply in cases
involving complex technologies like biologics and discusses two cases that
illustrate these difficulties.
In many patent disputes, application of the doctrine of equivalents can be
relatively straightforward. For example, consider a simple hypothetical patent
claiming a metal hook designed as a coat hanger. If another party
subsequently began producing a coat hanger that was exactly like the claimed
metal coat hanger in every respect, save that it was made of some different
material (that nevertheless performed substantially the same function in the
same way to achieve the same result as metal), it is easy to say that the original
patent’s claim scope should be broadened by the doctrine of equivalents to
cover the copy, which differed only in the substance used in its manufacture.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Graver Tank confronted a similar problem of
material substitution, where the accused infringer developed a welding flux
that substituted manganese for the magnesium used in the original, patented
flux.57 Although the patent at issue claimed “alkaline earth metal silicates,” a
group of elements that includes magnesium but not manganese, the Court
upheld the trial court’s determination that manganese and magnesium were
equivalent, and that the accused welding flux composition therefore infringed
under the doctrine of equivalents.58
Application of the doctrine to patents involving biologics often proves
more challenging. To understand why this is so, one must only consider the
simplest of biologic examples, a DNA nucleotide59 sequence:

Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement. To prohibit no
other would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be subordinating substance
to form. It would deprive him of the benefit of his invention and would foster concealment rather
than disclosure of inventions, which is one of the primary purposes of the patent system.
Id.
56

See Chisum, supra note 34, at 62 (describing the “Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum”).
339 U.S. at 610.
58 Id. at 612. In its decision, the Court noted that “[s]pecialists familiar with the problems of welding
compositions understood that manganese was equivalent to and could be substituted for magnesium . . . their
observations were confirmed by the literature of chemistry. . . . Though infringement was not literal, the
changes which avoid literal infringement are colorable only.” Id.
59 DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is the genetic storage material. DNA exists as sequences of nucleotides
(adenine, guanine, thymine, and cytosine) that encode for genes. Genes are transcribed into RNA (ribonucleic
57
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[C]onsider a claim reciting a purified, isolated DNA molecule
comprising the nucleotide sequence AAGGTCAGGTCA. What are
the pertinent limitations of this claim? Is a single nucleotide, A (the
base adenine), the relevant limitation to be met . . . ? Or is the
pertinent limitation . . . a codon of three nucleotides, AAG (which
together form the amino acid lysine)? Or is it an even longer stretch
of the recited nucleotide sequence (perhaps the [entire sequence])?
Federal Circuit decisions have not yet clearly answered these
60
questions; the answers are likely to be case-specific.

If applying the doctrine of equivalents to the example of changing a single
nucleotide in a simple DNA sequence (like the one shown above) makes for
difficult academic analysis, one must sympathize with attorneys, judges, and
juries that are forced to apply the doctrine to the complex panoply of
nucleotide sequences, proteins, antibodies, engineered cell lines, vaccines, and
viruses that constitute the current array of biologic pharmaceuticals, a class of
therapies that will almost certainly become more numerous and complex in the
future. The analysis is further complicated by the fact that simple changes,
even single changes at the DNA or protein level, can lead to drastic
consequences for the biologic in question.61
Two recent cases, Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering–
Plough Corp.62 and Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc.,63 illustrate the difficulties
postulated above. In Boehringer, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s ruling of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.64 The case
involved attenuated viruses that had been developed as vaccines against a
disease known as Porcine Reproductive Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS), which
devastated commercial pig herds in the 1980s.65 The accused infringers
acid) sequences that are subsequently translated into amino acid polypeptides, which then fold into structures
called proteins, which comprise the body’s molecular machinery. See generally BENJAMIN LEWIN, GENES X
(10th ed. 2011) (providing a detailed description of the structure and function of DNA, and the processes of
transcription and translation).
60 MUELLER, supra note 54, at 355–56.
61 In extreme cases, these changes may not only interfere with the normal function of a protein, but can
even render it toxic. See D. Alan White et al., Increased Sensitivity to Light-Induced Damage in a Mouse
Model of Autosomal Dominant Retinal Disease, 48 INVESTIGATIVE OPHTHALMOLOGY & VISUAL SCI. 1942
(2007) (describing how a single nucleotide change in the rhodopsin gene (which encodes an ocular protein that
is essential for vision) results in the production of a mutant protein that is responsible not only for a
progressive, degenerative form of blindness, but also an acute sensitivity to retinal damage from bright light).
62 320 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
63 373 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
64 320 F.3d at 1354.
65 Id. at 1343. Attenuated viruses are viruses that have been grown in tissue culture for several
generations. These viruses develop mutations that allow them to better survive in tissue culture, but that
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introduced evidence showing that the two viruses differed by at least seventythree nucleotides, and that the accused infringing virus exhibited substantial
differences from the original, including the fact that it did not make pigs sick
upon inoculation, and exhibited poor growth in porcine lung macrophages.66
In spite of these arguments, the Federal Circuit upheld the lower court’s
judgment of infringement, ruling that a reasonable jury could have found
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and stating, “While it may be
reasonable to assume that genetic similarity is a relevant comparison between
the viruses[,] . . . the jury was presented with expert testimony that the two
viral genomes are highly similar overall and that any differences between the
two are insignificant.”67
This case provides a wonderful illustration of the difficulties inherent in
applying the doctrine of equivalents in a biologics context. The fact that the
two viruses were so different in their nucleotide sequences, yet were still found
to be equivalent, leads one to wonder how many nucleotide changes would be
required to convince a fact-finder that an accused virus was not performing
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve the
same result. If seventy-three nucleotide differences were not enough to
demonstrate that the two viruses were not equivalent, would one hundred
differences have been enough? Half of the genome?68
Perhaps instead of highlighting nucleotide sequence differences, attorneys
for a similarly accused infringer should rather point out nucleotide
substitutions that change the structure of the proteins they encode in ways that
alter the proteins’ functionality, thus undermining the “function” leg of the
“function-way-result” triumvirate. However, highlighting differences between
two viruses at a functional level may not prove any more enlightening to a
fact-finder undertaking a doctrine of equivalents analysis than pointing out
differences in DNA sequence, as is illustrated by the fact that the two viruses
in Boehringer indeed exhibited differing efficacy as vaccines.69 Although the

reduce their virulence in a native host. Attenuated viruses that still elicit a host immune response are often
useful as vaccines. Id. at 1343–44.
66 Id. at 1351–52.
67 Id. at 1352.
68 A genome is an organism’s entire set of DNA. See MATT RIDLEY, GENOME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
A SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS (2001) (providing a chromosome-by-chromosome examination of the human
genome).
69 See 320 F.3d at 1351. In fact Schering–Plough, the accused infringer in this case, relied heavily upon
this fact in trying to prove noninfringement, arguing that its virus generated “a protective immune response
when administered to pigs, while a pig inoculated with [plaintiff’s virus] develops PRRS.” Id.
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Boehringer court avoided this question by focusing upon the activity of the
viruses in their production phase, ruling that vaccine efficacy was irrelevant to
the question of whether the two viruses lacked substantial differences in their
ability to be grown and propagated in a specific cell type,70 the case
nevertheless provides an illustration of the difficulties inherent in determining
equivalence in a biologics context.
Goldenberg v. Cytogen involved patents claiming radiolabeled antibodies
that could be used as markers for detecting cancer cells.71 The accused
infringing product, ProstaScint, was designed to screen for prostate tumors,72
and consisted of a radiolabeled antibody that targeted the intracellular portion
of a transmembrane antigen.73 The plaintiff’s patent claimed cancer detection
methods using labeled antibodies targeting “intracellular antigens.”74 The U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judgment in
favor of the accused infringer.75 In its decision, that court construed the phrase
“intracellular marker substance” as defining “an antigen existing within a body
cell.”76 It held that this distinguished the patentee’s claims from the accused
infringer’s product, which targeted markers that were “integral to the plasma
membrane and . . . cell surface antigen[s].”77 The district court refused to
accede to the plaintiff’s request to define “intracellular marker substance” as
including “sub-units of antigens,” which would have strengthened the
plaintiff’s case under the doctrine of equivalents because ProstaScint’s binding
site, while localized to the cell membrane, was nevertheless intracellular.78
70 Id. (“[W]hat happens when the virus is administered to a pig is irrelevant to the assessment of whether
the two viral strains are equivalent . . . . The fact that, in other contexts, [accused infringer’s virus] can
perform other functions in different ways to yield a different result is not relevant.”)
71 373 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Antibodies are specialized proteins created by the immune system to
identify foreign objects, including proteins, bacteria, and viruses. Immunologists refer to such foreign objects
as antigens. Antibodies bind specifically to antigens at target sites called epitopes. See HARVEY LODISH ET
AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY (6th ed. 2007) (providing a basic treatment of these and other molecular
biology concepts). Radiolabeled antibodies are antibodies that have been conjugated to radioactive tracer
materials. The tracers enable such antibodies to be used for localizing targets, such as tumor cells, within a
living body. See A. Bischof Delaloye & B. Delaloye, Tumor Imaging with Monoclonal Antibodies, 25
SEMINARS NUCLEAR MED. 144 (1995) (reviewing the history of tumor localization using radiolabeled
antibodies).
72 Goldenberg, 373 F.3d at 1162.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1160–63.
75 Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc., No. 00-763 (AET), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26075 (D.N.J. Apr. 29,
2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 373 F.3d at 1158.
76 Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
77 Id. at *9.
78 Id. at *4.
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The district court paid significant attention to the prosecution history of the
patents in question,79 as well as the testimony of experts for both parties.80 In
announcing its decision, the court stated:
Defendants argue that ProstaScint does not bind to an antigen
located within a tumor cell. Instead, ProstaScint targets PSMA. The
Court has determined that PSMA is a cell surface antigen not an
intracellular marker substance. Furthermore, plaintiff’s discussion of
“function” and “way” ignores the distinction . . . between antibodies
that bind to intracellular antigens and those that bind to cell surface
ones. In sum, plaintiffs have not met the requirements of the
81
“function-way-result” test.

The Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment
under the doctrine of equivalents, and remanded for consideration as to
whether an antibody targeting an intracellular domain of a transmembrane
antigen is the equivalent of an antibody targeting an intracellular antigen.82 In
its ruling, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s classification of
transmembrane epitopes as being distinct from intracellular epitopes, holding
that “[t]ransmembrane antigens . . . appear to be a category of their own, and
are not susceptible to the black and white categorization made by the district
court.”83 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit ruled that the plaintiff had presented
a sufficient factual dispute under the doctrine of equivalents to avoid summary
judgment.84
The disconnect between the rulings of the district court and the Federal
Circuit in Goldenberg v. Cytogen provides another example of the difficulties
inherent in applying the doctrine of equivalents to cases involving biologics.
Whereas the district court was obviously persuaded by the defendant’s
argument that the intracellular domain of a transmembrane antigen was not
equivalent to an intracellular antigen, the Federal Circuit found there to be a
factual dispute as to the equivalency of the two. The fact that disagreement
could exist between the two courts suggests that a jury facing similar questions

79

See supra note 49.
Goldenberg, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26075, at *5–18.
81 Id. at *17 (citation omitted).
82 Goldenberg, 373 F.3d at 1168–69. In other words, the question was whether an antibody targeting an
antigen that was completely within a target cell (an intracellular antigen) was the equivalent of an antibody
targeted to the intracellular part of an antigen that was embedded within the membrane of a target cell (the
intracellular portion of a transmembrane antigen). See supra note 71.
83 Goldenberg, 373 F.3d at 1168.
84 Id. at 1169.
80
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would be similarly conflicted, if not more so. It must also be considered that a
jury confronting the already difficult scientific issues at hand would, unlike the
judges of the district court and the Federal Circuit, presumably also be
unfamiliar with the legal niceties involved in applying the doctrine of
equivalents.
Among other things, this jury would have to be educated as to the meaning
of such scientific concepts as the difference between the “intracellular” and
“extracellular” portions of a cell, membrane biology (including the definition
of “transmembrane”), the workings of the immune system, by which
“antibodies” interact with “epitopes,” which are in turn simply portions of
“antigens,” and the process by which such “antibodies” can be “radiolabeled”
with radioactive tracers and used to localize certain “epitopes” associated with
cancers. In the end, any jury considering the question would be subjected to
the conflicting testimony of various scientific experts hired by the opposing
parties, each providing complex evidence to support her view, and further
obscuring the central issues of the case with technical details.85 After this
crash course in graduate-level molecular and cell biology, the jury would
finally be expected to render a decision concerning a dispute about which both
scientific and judicial experts were unable to reach a consensus. One
sympathizes.
III. FURTHER ANALYZING THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN APPLYING THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS TO BIOLOGICS CASES
Part II illustrated the difficulties inherent in applying the doctrine of
equivalents to cases involving biologics. The discussions of Boehringer and
Goldenberg highlighted the complex nature of the issues confronting attorneys,
judges, and juries dealing with biologics patents.86 This Part discusses
additional factors that must be addressed when considering the doctrine of
equivalents in a biologics context. First, this Part further explores the
difficulties, alluded to above, that typical juries have in deciding cases
involving complex scientific or technical concepts. Next, it examines more
85 See Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform:
Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269, 280 (1989) (“[J]uries are likely to
be misled or confused in [complex] cases by the ‘battle of experts’ over the technical evidence, thereby
eliminating any chance for a fair, rational decision.”).
86 Of course, this is just the beginning. Given the increasing popularity of biologics, see supra notes 8–
14 and accompanying text, novel biologics of increasing complexity can be expected to be developed apace,
presenting even greater challenges for discerning equivalency.
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fully the “Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum” mentioned above,87 and
argues that the inherent uncertainty created by the doctrine of equivalents in
broadening patent scope has a particularly chilling effect upon biologics
innovation. Finally, this Part argues that licensing, which can often provide at
least a partial remedy against the potential of the doctrine of equivalents to
chill innovation, is generally not an acceptable alternative in the field of
biologics.
A. Juries Are Likely to Have Difficulty Resolving Cases Dealing with
Biologics
One of the biggest drawbacks of the doctrine of equivalents in biologics
cases is that, in the absence of summary judgment, disputed matters of fact fall
to a jury decision. In Boehringer, the court ruled on an appeal of a renewed
motion for summary judgment filed by the accused infringing party.88 As
such, the court was limited in its review, and could overturn the lower court’s
denial of the motion “only if the jury’s factual findings are not supported by
substantial evidence, or if the legal conclusions implied in the jury’s verdict
cannot be supported by that evidence.”89 Unfortunately, there is substantial
evidence that juries have difficulty resolving cases involving complex
scientific issues of the sort common to biologics patent disputes.90 The typical
juror has achieved a high school education or its equivalent, often has
difficulty understanding complex jury instructions, and is easily misled by
expert testimony.91
The limitations of the typical jury present a huge problem for parties to
biologics patent disputes, which involve technologies at the forefront of

87
88

See supra note 34 (describing the “Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum”).
Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering–Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir.

2003).
89

Id. (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
See generally Alan Feigenbaum, Special Juries: Deterring Spurious Medical Malpractice Litigation in
State Courts, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1361, 1389–96 (2003) (concluding that the average juror lacks the
educational background necessary to understand the “testimony . . . concerning complex scientific and
technical evidence” that is often presented in medical malpractice cases); Jody Weisberg Menon, Adversarial
Medical and Scientific Testimony and Lay Jurors: A Proposal for Medical Malpractice Reform, 21 AM. J.L. &
MED. 281, 281 (1995) (examining the “special problems” confronted by jurors attempting to understand expert
testimony involving “medical and scientific issues” in medical malpractice cases).
91 Feigenbaum, supra note 90; Menon, supra note 90; see also Janet C. Hoeffel, The Dark Side of DNA
Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465, 510 (1990)
(highlighting potential drawbacks to the use of DNA profiling in criminal trials, and noting the potential for
expert witnesses to mislead lay juries with complex scientific evidence).
90
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innovation, and where issues may hinge upon legal and scientific concepts that
even experts can have difficulty understanding.92 The possibility that juries
can be fooled by the clever use of complicated scientific testimony is
especially troubling in biologics cases involving the doctrine of equivalents, as
both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have stressed the importance
of expert testimony in such cases.93 It was presumably with these issues of
jury qualification in mind that the Supreme Court ruled in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc. that in patent disputes, questions of claim
construction were matters for the court, rather than the jury, to decide.94
However, reserving claim construction for the courts does not change the fact
that in cases involving the doctrine of equivalents, ultimate questions of fact
are often decided by juries95 that are poorly equipped to deal with complex
scientific issues.96
Several solutions have been proposed to deal with this problem. Some
commentators have suggested that the federal jury selection procedures should
be amended to create “special juries” that consist of jurors meeting a certain
threshold of education, such as a college degree.97 However, it could be
argued that this might not provide an adequate solution to the problem, as
possession of a college degree is not necessarily a sinecure for ensuring a
92 See Gregory D. Leibold, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent-Infringement
Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 623 (1996) (noting that “[t]he rapid increase in the complexity of
technology being patented (especially in the computer-related and biological fields) has made patent trials
extremely difficult for average jurors to understand,” and recommending the use of special juries to address
these concerns); see also Feigenbaum, supra note 90, at 1364–65 (also advocating the use of special juries in
medical malpractice cases involving complicated scientific testimony).
93 AquaTex Indus. v. Techniche Solutions, 479 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Both the Supreme
Court and this court have made clear that the evidence of equivalents must be from the perspective of someone
skilled in the art, for example through testimony of experts or others versed in the technology.” (quoting
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)) (internal quotation mark
omitted)).
94 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996).
95 See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding
that determination of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a question of fact for the jury), rev’d,
520 U.S. 17 (1997).
96 Potential issues affecting the ability of jurors to process scientific evidence may even arise from such
mundane sources as popular television programs. Evidence of this can be found in a study documenting the
“CSI effect,” in which “juror expectations and demands about scientific evidence” were shown to have been
increased by the popularity of the hit television series CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, with the result being
that jurors “have high expectations that the prosecutor will present some scientific evidence in virtually every
criminal case.” Donald E. Shelton et al., A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific
Evidence: Does the “CSI Effect” Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 333, 336, 367 (2006).
97 See supra note 92 (citing articles that describe the issue of juror confusion and recommending the use
of expert juries).
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juror’s understanding of complicated scientific issues. Others have advocated
the use of alternative dispute resolution as a means for parties in commercial
intellectual property disputes to avoid the perils of ordinary litigation through
the use of skilled mediators or arbitrators, or even by “creat[ing] their own trial
with an expert judge and even a panel of expert jurors.”98 However, in cases
involving biologics, and especially follow-on biologics, parties may be
unlikely to turn to alternative dispute resolution. This is because the patent
holder, not wanting to lose its limited monopoly, may have little or no
incentive to negotiate with a follow-on manufacturer, while conversely the
follow-on manufacturer wins nothing unless it is successful in challenging the
patent or proving that its product does not infringe.
In the absence of better options, courts may choose to keep biologics cases
from the jury whenever possible by ruling summarily on infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents, exercising their traditional judicial prerogatives
over claim construction and, in appropriate situations, applying limits upon the
doctrine such as the all-limitations rule or prosecution history estoppel.99
However, as biologic pharmaceuticals become increasingly successful and
more products are brought to market, the number of disputes over ownership of
biologics patents will only increase.100 This will inevitably result in more
biologics cases involving the doctrine of equivalents, presenting difficult
questions of fact that are not amenable to summary judgment.101 These cases
will be decided by juries that in many cases simply are not well prepared to
handle them.

98 Scott H. Blackman & Rebecca M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Commercial Intellectual
Property Disputes, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1709, 1716 (1998); see also infra Part III.B (discussing the merits of
expert juries for deciding technologically complex cases).
99 In fact, the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. indirectly addressed
these same concerns over the ability of the common jury to handle complicated patent issues. 520 U.S. 17, 39
n.8 (1997). Interestingly, the Court did not directly rule upon whether the doctrine of equivalents is even a
question for the jury. Id. at 39; see also David R. Todd, How Modern Treatment of 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) Has
Caused Confusion: Hilton Davis v. Warner-Jenkinson and the Right to a Jury on the Issue of Patent
Infringement Under the “Equitable” Doctrine of Equivalents, 1996 BYU L. REV. 141 (outlining the historical
controversy over the jury’s role in decisions involving the doctrine of equivalents). But cf. infra note 202 and
accompanying text (cautioning against underestimating the capacity of lay jurors to participate meaningfully in
complex litigation).
100 See supra notes 8–14, 160 and accompanying text (describing the increasing popularity of biologic
pharmaceuticals).
101 See supra Part II.
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B. The Doctrine of Equivalents Chills Innovation in the Biologics Arena
Commentators aptly describe patent law as “a utilitarian set of property
rules that derives legitimacy to the extent it promotes innovation and
welfare.”102 As has been discussed, patents are basically compromises
between the government and the patent holder in which the former grants the
latter a limited monopoly over the invention in question in return for the
latter’s disclosure to the public the methods for creating the invention.103
Patent law is very specific about the requirements for such disclosures, in that
they must be enabling or, in other words, must teach a “person skilled in the art
to which it pertains” how to practice the invention.104 The requirement for
enabling disclosures is thought to be a key for promoting innovation, as later
inventors can examine the methods of creating the patented invention, and thus
learn how to improve upon it.105 However, as long as the original patent is in
effect, subsequent innovators cannot practice improved inventions that would
infringe upon the original; therefore, to encourage innovation, the ideal patent
would very clearly delineate exactly what its claims protect. This is sometimes
referred to as the “notice” function of patents.106 The doctrine of equivalents
by its very nature allows the scope of protection to be enlarged beyond the
literal claims of the patent, thus defeating, to a certain extent, the notice
function of patents.107 This can have a stifling effect upon innovation,108
particularly in the field of biologics.

102 Alden F. Abbott & Suzanne T. Michel, The Right Balance of Competition Policy and Intellectual
Property Law: A Perspective on Settlements of Pharmaceutical Litigation, 46 IDEA 1, 8 (2005).
103 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (describing the Constitution’s Patent
Clause as “both a grant of power and a limitation,” and observing that Congress “may [not] enlarge the patent
monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby”); see also supra
notes 15, 17 (discussing the incentive structure of the patent system).
104 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). “The enablement requirement ensures that the public knowledge is enriched
by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims.” Nat’l Recovery
Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (1999).
105 “The scope of enablement . . . is that which is disclosed in the specification plus the scope of what
would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art without undue experimentation.” Nat’l Recovery Techs., at
1196. But see Holbrook, supra note 17, at 136–39 (arguing that disclosure requirements are actually more
important for demonstrating possession of an invention (and therefore the right to a patent) than for teaching
the public about the invention).
106 See Karen Millane Whitney, Sources of Patent Prosecution History Must Not Violate Public Notice
Requirement, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 266, 271 (2001) (“Patents primarily function to give the public
notice.”); see also supra notes 15, 17 (discussing notice and the incentive structure of the patent system).
107 See Holbrook, supra note 17 (describing notice as the primary purpose of disclosure); Nicole S.
Robbins, Note, The Curtailment of the Doctrine of Equivalents: Courts Emphasize the Public Notice Function
of Patent Claims, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 323 (2001) (describing conflict between the doctrine of equivalents
and the notice function of patents); supra notes 34, 44 (describing Professor Chisum’s “Fair Protection-
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Courts, judges, and scholars have struggled with and quarreled over this
drawback of the doctrine of equivalents since its creation.109 Some of the
strongest criticism of the modern doctrine of equivalents has come from within
the Supreme Court itself.110 In his dissent in Graver Tank, Justice Black
lamented the Court’s expansion of the doctrine beyond its traditional limits as
a “sterilization of Acts of Congress and prior decisions,” and went on to
conclude that the Court’s decision
treat[s] a patent claim “like a nose of wax, which may be turned and
twisted in any direction . . . so as to make it include something more
than, or something different from, what its words express. . . . The
claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of
making the patentee define precisely what his invention is; and it is
unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in
a manner different from the plain import of its terms.” Giving [a]
patentee the benefit of a grant that it did not precisely claim is no less
“unjust to the public” and no less an evasion of [statutory
requirements] merely because done in the name of the “doctrine of
111
equivalents.”

Striving for clarity and a bright-line interpretation of patent law, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit began severely limiting the application of the
doctrine of equivalents in its decisions.112 As discussed in Part I, however, the

Certainty Conundrum” and observing that the Supreme Court has recognized the tension between the doctrine
of equivalents and the notice function of patents).
108 See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future After
Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2004) (arguing that the doctrine of equivalents impedes innovation).
109 See id.
110 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612–18 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 613–14 (third alteration in original) (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886)).
112 See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2003) (“The Federal Circuit increasingly has articulated rules of
law to promote certainty, at the expense of fairness. The root of this bias likely derives from the court’s
Congressional mandate to promote uniformity and certainty in patent law.”); Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen
Nard, Invention, Refinement, and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93
GEO. L.J. 1947, 1951–53 (2005) (sympathizing with the Federal Circuit’s concerns over the uncertainty
engendered by the doctrine of equivalents, but noting that “the [doctrine of equivalents] creates a social benefit
by allowing patent applicants to avoid certain refinement costs during patent prosecution”). But see Doug
Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to Meurer and Nard, 93 GEO. L.J. 2013,
2032 (2005) (arguing that the doctrine of equivalents is necessary to protect patentees from unforeseen
technological developments, to prevent “wasteful efforts to perfect claim language,” and to allow the patent
system to make good decisions “by bringing into the process information that is for various reasons
unavailable early in the life of the patent”).
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Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson113 and Festo114 rejected these stringent
limitations, and articulated the current, more flexible limits of the doctrine.115
The conflicts highlighted above are at the heart of the “Fair ProtectionCertainty Conundrum,” coined by Professor Chisum in 1998.116 Professor
Chisum argued that patent law involved constant tension between “Certainty”
and “Fairness”:
There is clearly an interest in providing a clear definition of the scope
of the patent right; lack of clarity can impede legitimate investment in
technology-based products and services. On the other hand, strict
and literal adherence to the written claim in determining the scope of
protection can invite subversion of a valuable right and substantially
117
diminish the economic value of patents.

The doctrine of equivalents is the perfect embodiment of this conundrum.
While on the one hand, it provides patentees with a remedy to guard against
the inequitable conduct of copyists who could skirt patent protection by
making “unimportant and insubstantial changes” to patented devices,118 this
comes at the expense of a broadening of the scope of patent protection that can
substantially increase uncertainty.119

113 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). Here, the Court stated, in
perhaps the most convincing (and final) pronouncement concerning its support for the doctrine, “Congress can
legislate the doctrine of equivalents out of existence any time it chooses. The various policy arguments now
made by both sides are thus best addressed to Congress, not this Court.” Id. at 28. The Court later repeated
this argument verbatim in its Festo decision. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535
U.S. 722, 733 (2002).
114 535 U.S. at 722.
115 See Sarnoff, supra note 108 (criticizing the Court’s articulation of the modern doctrine of equivalents).
116 Chisum, supra note 34.
117 Id. at 7.
118 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (noting that the
doctrine of equivalents exists to prevent the “unscrupulous copyist” from “mak[ing] unimportant and
insubstantial changes and substitutions to the patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take
the copied matter outside the claim, and hence outside the reach of law”).
119 Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1,
46 (2009) (“[A]ssessing the literal scope of a patent is rife with uncertainty. The use of the doctrine of
equivalents to expand patent scope compounds this uncertainty, creating high transaction costs for third parties
in assessing the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude.” (footnote omitted)); see also Sarnoff, supra note 108,
at 1167 (“Whatever equivalency standard is applied, the modern doctrine necessarily expands patent scope and
renders it more uncertain than direct application of construed claim language. The modern doctrine adds to the
scope of application of construed claims.”).
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This broadening of patent scope can have a particularly chilling effect upon
innovation in the field of biologics.120 As Part II illustrated, the complexity of
biologics technology can make patent boundaries inherently uncertain in the
first place; the doctrine of equivalents increases this uncertainty.121 This is
illustrated in Boehringer, where the court’s decision ultimately gave the
patentee rights to an amorphous class of viruses grown in a specific cell type,
regardless of the properties that those viruses later exhibited as therapeutic
agents, with the limits of the class being defined only by the ephemeral
constraints of the doctrine of equivalents.122 In effect, the Boehringer decision
provides a template to creators of vaccines for crafting patents in a way that
would stifle innovation by keeping improved versions of the vaccine off the
market.123
Unpredictability in patent rights leads to increased transaction costs with
respect to licensing of potential blocking patents,124 as well as increased
operating costs due to the possibility of unexpected litigation.125 These
increased operating costs are a significant barrier to follow-on innovators in the
field of biologics that already face high operating costs due to difficulties and
risks that are not shared by typical generic drug manufacturers.126 This could
prevent many potential innovators from entering the biologics market
altogether, with the resultant lack of innovation hurting consumers that would
otherwise benefit from the wider selection of less costly and more effective
biologics that increased competition in the industry would provide.127 It is
important for courts to recognize the drawbacks of such uncertainty, and
exercise restraint over the application of the doctrine of equivalents in

120 Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and
Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 813 (2001) (“In the context of the biopharmaceutical industry, broad
patents, particularly on upstream invention, represent the main threat to competition.”).
121 See supra note 119.
122 See supra Part II.
123 See supra Part II.
124 See infra Part III.C.
125 See infra note 144.
126 See Henry Grabowski et al., The Market for Follow-On Biologics: How Will It Evolve?, 25 HEALTH
AFF. 1291, 1300 (2006) (“[I]ncreased uncertainty and IP litigation in biotech also would have major significant
negative-incentive effects on capital market decisions for developing private and public biotech firms with
promising pipelines.”); Sahr, supra note 14, at 47–54 (citing special challenges that future manufacturers of
biologic follow-ons are likely to face, including more stringent equivalency rules under FDA guidelines,
higher fixed development costs associated with more onerous regulatory barriers, and the overall complexity
of biologic therapeutics).
127 See Sahr, supra note 14, at 41–56.
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biologics cases to avoid unnecessarily broadening basic patents in a way that
chills innovation in a field that is vital to public health.
C. Licensing Is Not an Acceptable Solution
The doctrine of equivalents creates uncertainty regarding patent scope and,
as discussed above, this is perhaps even more true for biologics patents.128 In
many situations, patent disputes involving truly valuable technologies are
resolved through the use of licensing agreements, with the owner of the patent
licensing its use to another party.129 However, while licensing agreements may
provide an acceptable solution to patent conflicts in many industries, there is
evidence that they are of limited use in the field of biologics,130 especially in
cases where the doctrine of equivalents is involved.131
Licensing can be expected to occur when patents are distributed evenly
among firms participating in a particular industry.132 Such firms have a strong
incentive to cross-license intellectual property when “their interests are
symmetrical: they need their competitors’ patents just as much as the

128

See supra Part II.B.
See Joseph C. Cianfrani, An Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1
(1997) (noting that in many instances such problems may be resolved through licensing or outright purchase of
the patent in question). But see Abbott, supra note 102 (examining the antitrust issues inherent in the
controversial practice of “reverse payments” by pioneer drug firms to follow-on competitors). Some
commentators have even suggested that patent law could be modified to allow for compulsory licensing in
certain instances, noting that the German Patent Act in section 24 provides for “compulsory license in cases in
which a patentee is not willing to license for reasonable compensation.” Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161,
1230 n.263 (2000). But see Symposium, Panel I: Do Overly Broad Patents Lead to Restrictions on Innovation
and Competition?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 947, 992 (2005) (“[P]eople, especially in
the pharmaceutical industry, are very much opposed to compulsory licensing[;] . . . they believe that would be
the death knell of innovation.”).
130 See Rai, supra note 120, at 831–34 (arguing that historically, in industries relying on cumulative
innovation, broad patents on initial inventions are not effectively licensed, and that “there are indications in the
biopharmaceutical industry that development through tailored licensing will be difficult to achieve”).
131 See M. Aminthe Broussard, Ambivalence in Equivalents: Problems and Solutions for Patent Law’s
Doctrine of Equivalents, 64 LA. L. REV. 119, 131 (2003) (arguing that restricting the application of the
doctrine of equivalents would provide “clarity and certainty for potential infringers,” who then “could better
make long-term decisions, such as whether to attempt to buy a license”); Qing Lin, A Proposed Test for
Applying the Doctrine of Equivalents to Biotechnology Inventions: The Nonobviousness Test, 74 WASH. L.
REV. 885, 898 (1999) (observing that the “function-way-result” and “known interchangeability” tests that have
traditionally been used to resolve questions involving the doctrine of equivalents are “not applicable to certain
infringement disputes in biotechnology”).
132 See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 623–27 (2005) (describing
licensing as a solution to over-patenting in the burgeoning field of nanotechnology).
129
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competitors need their patents.”133 However, this ideal situation rarely exists
in the real world, especially in fields in which basic technologies have become
so heavily patented as to create a “patent thicket.”134 Patent owners in such
fields may be reluctant to license valuable technologies, especially to potential
competitors in the same industry.135 Accordingly, a patent holder like the one
in Boehringer136 might be reluctant to license its virus production methods to
an accused infringer that is a potential competitor within the patent holder’s
own industry.137
Additionally, transaction costs associated with licensing agreements are
exacerbated when there is uncertainty as to the value of the patent to be
licensed.138 The simple reason for this is that the interested parties have
difficulty determining what subject matter is actually protected by the patent,
and are thus unsure of its value.139 The doctrine of equivalents leads to
uncertainty regarding the scope of patent coverage,140 particularly with respect
to biologics patents.141 This increase in uncertainty leads to high transaction
costs, making it less likely that conflicts over patent infringement in the field
of biologics arising under the doctrine of equivalents will be resolved through
licensing agreements.142 Accordingly, even if a patent holder such as the one
in Boehringer was willing to license its technology to a competitor, the fact
that the doctrine of equivalents makes the limits of the patent itself uncertain
could prevent the parties from reaching an agreement. For instance, the patent
133

Id. at 623.
A “patent thicket” is “an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize
new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees.” Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 119–22 (Adam B. Jaffe,
Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001).
135 See Lemley, supra note 132, at 625 (describing the breakdown of “efficient licensing” when a “patent
thicket” develops).
136 See supra Part II.
137 See Natasha N. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 1, 23 n.88 (2005) (describing biotech patent thickets created when the “sheer number of gene patents
essentially precludes the use of any of the disclosed information by researchers unless multiple licenses and
permissions are obtained”); see also infra notes 195–96 and accompanying text (describing another situation
where licensing did not provide the solution to a biotech patent dispute).
138 See Cianfrani, supra note 129, at para. 2 n.2 (observing that disputes over a patent’s value may be
“exacerbated by any uncertainty in the patent system, especially by the doctrine of equivalents as the parties
can have widely divergent views on whether the patent is infringed”).
139 Id.
140 See Lichtman, supra note 112, at 2031 (“The doctrine makes patent scope less certain and through that
stands in the way of negotiation and compliance efforts.”)
141 Lin, supra note 131; see also supra Part II (providing case study examples of the uncertainty
engendered by the doctrine of equivalents in a biologics context).
142 See Cianfrani, supra note 129.
134
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holder may believe that its patent covers more subject matter under the
doctrine of equivalents than it truly does, leading it to charge a prohibitively
high licensing fee.143 Conversely, the potential licensee might feel that it could
modify its own invention in order to escape the doctrine’s penumbra.144 In any
event, the inherent uncertainty of patent rights is clouded by the doctrine of
equivalents, and this is especially pronounced in such cutting-edge fields as
biologics. Such uncertainty makes licensing decisions risky for the interested
parties, driving up transaction costs and stifling innovation. This is especially
troubling for biologics, where innovation through both direct competition and
follow-on products is necessary to make the public health benefits of these
miracle breakthroughs widely available at the most reasonable cost.145 The
failure of licensing to provide an effective outlet for innovation underscores the
need for courts to prevent biotechnology patent rights from becoming overly
broadened through the use of the doctrine of equivalents.146
IV. ENSURING PROPER APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IN
BIOLOGICS CASES
As the Supreme Court noted in Warner-Jenkinson, “Congress can legislate
the doctrine of equivalents out of existence any time it chooses.”147 At first
glance this solution may appear attractive, considering the difficulties inherent
in applying the doctrine in a biologics context.148 However, while legislative
143 See Broussard, supra note 131, at 133 (noting situations involving the doctrine of equivalents where
“some patentees were seeking greater coverage than their patents allowed[,] . . . blackmailing competitors into
paying licensing fees”); Rai, supra note 120, at 834 (arguing that such disagreements over patent worth are
“particularly likely in the context of upstream molecular biology research because the negotiating parties are
often scientists who may overestimate the value of their scientific contribution”).
144 But the wise innovator will exercise caution when doing so, keeping in mind Justice Black’s warning
that an innovator “cannot rely on what the language of a patent claims. He must be able, at the peril of heavy
infringement damages, to forecast how far a court relatively unversed in a particular technological field will
expand the [patent’s] language . . . .” Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 617
(1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
145 See supra notes 8–13; see also Sahr, supra note 14, at 47–48 (“Price competition among multiple
follow-on manufacturers is essential to substantially lower the cost of biologics to consumers. Prices will not
be significantly lowered until several interchangeable products reach the market.”).
146 See Rai, supra note 120, at 813 (“In the context of the biopharmaceutical industry, broad patents,
particularly on upstream invention, represent the main threat to competition. Thus patent law needs to take the
lead in preserving competition, primarily by limiting the scope of patents on upstream invention.”); Broussard,
supra note 131, at 131 (observing that costs arising because of the uncertainties engendered by the doctrine of
equivalents are “passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices”).
147 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997).
148 Alternatively, one could limit the abolishment of the doctrine of equivalents to cases involving
biologics. Although this limitation would be a less drastic solution than totally abolishing the doctrine in all
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abolishment of the doctrine would certainly tilt the “Fair Protection-Certainty”
balance in the direction of greater certainty, this shift would of course be
accompanied by the sacrifice of a certain amount of fairness to patentees.
Patents exist to promote innovation.149 As discussed previously, in a biologics
context the application of the doctrine of equivalents can unduly dampen the
incentives for follow-on innovators to create new and improved versions of
pioneer biologics.150 However, abolishing the doctrine altogether would tilt
the balance too far in the other direction, narrowing the scope of patent
protection and reducing the incentives for firms to develop pioneer biologics in
the first place.151
The best solution to the problem of applying the doctrine of equivalents in
biologics cases is therefore not to abolish the doctrine completely, but rather to
carefully limit its application through a variety of means. This Part first
discusses two legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents (prosecution
history estoppel and the all limitations rule), provides examples of biologics
patent cases where these limitations were correctly brought into play, and
prefaces the discussion with an argument that judges should apply these
limitations with an eye toward protecting the public interest in biologics
innovation. Next, this Part discusses the benefits of impaneling expert juries to
resolve cases involving biologics patents. Finally, this Part argues that in cases
where the doctrine of equivalents is applied in a biologics context, the patent
holder should be denied injunctive relief—in effect limiting its remedy to a
compulsory license. This would provide fair compensation to the patentee
while still allowing the accused infringer to bring its product to market.

cases, it still leaves the not insignificant problem of defining what a biologic actually is. See Rader, supra note
8, at 743 (discussing the “Babel-like situation with terminological chaos and anarchy” that applies to defining
biologics as a class).
149 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
150 See supra Part III.B.
151 See Ryan Thomas Grace, Losing the Forest Among the Trees in the Festo Saga—Rationalizing the
Doctrine of Equivalents and Prosecution History Estoppel in View of the Historical Justifications for Patent
Protection, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 275 (2004) (arguing that expansion of prosecution history estoppel
following Festo unduly limits application of the doctrine of equivalents, reducing incentives for inventors to
disclose inventions). But see Meurer & Nard, supra note 112, at 1998 (arguing that while the doctrine of
equivalents is important to the patent system, it must nevertheless be restricted to maintain balance, and
characterizing concerns that restricting the doctrine of equivalents will reduce incentives for innovation as
“probably overstated”).
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A. Legal Limitations on the Doctrine of Equivalents
An effective way to prevent misuse of the doctrine of equivalents to overly
broaden biotechnology patent rights can be found in the power of the courts
themselves to limit the doctrine’s application. The Supreme Court in WarnerJenkinson was fully cognizant of the danger that the doctrine of equivalents
could acquire “a life of its own, unbounded by . . . patent claims.”152 To guard
against this, the Court specifically discussed various judicial limits that could
be applied by the lower courts to militate against this threat.153 In the years
following Warner-Jenkinson, courts, striving for certainty in the field of patent
law, began to rely heavily upon these judicial limitations to limit application of
the doctrine of equivalents.154 This culminated in the Federal Circuit’s ruling
that one of the limitations, prosecution history estoppel, provided a complete
bar to the doctrine’s application.155 This holding was overruled by the
Supreme Court’s Festo decision, which held prosecution history estoppel to be,
rather, an incomplete bar.156 However, so long as the lower courts respect the
Supreme Court’s clear desire to preserve the doctrine as a means of protecting
patent holders from the “unscrupulous copyist,”157 these legal limitations can
provide important means for limiting the doctrine’s application to biologics
cases. Moreover, these limitations are at the court’s discretion, allowing issues
involving the doctrine of equivalents in biologics cases to be resolved by
summary judgment, avoiding altogether the problems associated with jury
decisions in technologically complex cases.158 A review of the caselaw reveals
numerous instances where the courts have limited the reach of the doctrine in
biologics cases.159

152

520 U.S. at 28–29; see also supra note 44.
See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8 (describing some of these limitations and noting that, “[o]f
course, the various legal limitations on the application of the doctrine of equivalents are to be determined by
the court, either on a pretrial motion for partial summary judgment or on a motion for judgment as a matter of
law”).
154 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
155 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated, 535
U.S. 722 (2002).
156 Festo, 535 U.S. at 737. The Court acknowledged concerns that the doctrine of equivalents led to
inherent uncertainty in the field of patent law, but argued, “[t]hese concerns . . . are not new. Each time the
Court has considered the doctrine it has acknowledged this uncertainty as the price of ensuring the appropriate
incentives for innovation, and it has affirmed the doctrine over dissents that urged a more certain rule.” Id. at
732; see also supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
157 See supra note 29.
158 See supra Part III.A.
159 See infra Part IV.A.1.
153
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Before discussing the legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents, it is
important to point out that innovation in the field of biologic pharmaceuticals
is of great public interest, as these therapies have the potential to cure a variety
of diseases that in the prebiologics era were untreatable.160 Courts already
factor the public interest into infringement analysis, particularly when
considering permanent injunctions as a remedy for patent infringement.161 For
example, in Hybritech Inc. v. Abbot Laboratories, the Federal Circuit upheld a
lower court’s refusal to grant a permanent injunction that would have
prevented the distribution of cancer and hepatitis test kits.162 The field of
biologics is particularly susceptible to the chilling effect that can occur when
patent rights are overly broad or ambiguous.163 Given the substantial public
interest in continued innovation in the field of biologics, courts should apply
the following limitations on the doctrine of equivalents (and indeed, should
apply the doctrine of equivalents in general) to biologics cases, especially with
respect to technologies that directly impact human health and safety, so as to
increase the certainty of patent scope, thus preserving incentives for innovation
in the field.
1. Prosecution History Estoppel
Prosecution history estoppel prevents a patentee from claiming as
equivalents limitations that were surrendered during the patent application
160

See, e.g., WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33901, FOLLOW-ON
BIOLOGICS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION ISSUES 1 (2009) (“[T]he biologics market is rapidly
expanding by any number of measures, including the quantity of approved products, the size of the market,
and the importance of these drugs to the health of U.S. citizens.”); Ingrid Kaldre, The Future of Generic
Biologics: Should the United States “Follow-On” the European Pathway?, 2008 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0009,
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2008dltr0009.pdf (discussing the “unique” promise these
drugs hold for treating life-threatening diseases and discussing the obstacles facing generic versions of pioneer
biologics); Caroline Lochhead, Huge Boon for Biotech in Measure, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 6, 2009, at A1
(describing biologics as “miracle breakthrough therapies” that may one day cure diseases like “AIDS,
Parkinson’s, multiple sclerosis . . . and many others”); Karen Tumulty & Michael Scherer, How Drug-Industry
Lobbyists Won on Health-Care, TIME (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/
0,8599,1931595-1,00.html (“These miraculous drugs . . . are widely regarded as the future of the
pharmaceutical industry and, indeed, of medicine itself. . . . As policymakers look for ways to control healthcare costs, the price of biologics is drawing more and more scrutiny.”).
161 See eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (describing the four factors used to
determine whether a permanent injunction should be granted, including whether “the public interest would not
be disserved by a permanent injunction”).
162 849 F.2d 1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Datascope Corp. v. Kontron, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 889,
895 (D. Mass. 1985) (refusing to grant preliminary injunction on the sale of intra-aortic inflatable balloon
catheters (IABs) in part because “the public will be harmed by an injunction [because] some physicians prefer
defendant’s dual lumen IABs”), aff’d, 786 F.2d 398 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
163 See supra Part III.B.
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process.164 The Supreme Court in Festo held that when a patentee makes an
amendment to a patent application that narrows the scope of its claims without
somehow explaining that the amendment was unrelated to patentability, this
amendment creates a rebuttable presumption against subsequent assertion of
the doctrine of equivalents to “reclaim” what was surrendered.165 The Court
went on to explain that this presumption could be rebutted when a narrowing
amendment could not “reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular
equivalent,” and noted that such situations could arise when the surrendered
equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of the amendment, when the rationale
behind the amendment bore only a tangential relationship to patentability, or if
for any other reason the patentee should not have reasonably been expected to
have described the equivalent in question.166 In addition to this “amendmentbased estoppel,” courts also recognize “argument-based estoppel,” in which
claim scope is surrendered by statements made to the patent examiner during
patent prosecution.167
Examples from recent caselaw illustrate instances in which courts have
used prosecution history estoppel to prevent the use of the doctrine of
equivalents to unduly broaden the scope of pharmaceutical and biologics
patents. In Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Laboratories, Inc., the Federal
Circuit upheld a lower court’s decision to bar a patentee from using the
doctrine of equivalents because of prosecution history estoppel.168 The
patentee, in response to an obviousness rejection by a patent examiner, had
modified its claims regarding a generic version of an ACE inhibitor169 so as to
164 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733–34 (2002) (describing
how claim surrender triggers prosecution history estoppel).
165 Id. at 740 (“When the patentee is unable to explain the reason for amendment, estoppel not only
applies but also ‘bar[s] the application of the doctrine of equivalents as to that element.’ These words do not
mandate a complete bar; they are limited to the circumstance where ‘no explanation is established.’”
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 33 (1997))).
166 Id. at 740–41.
167 See Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Envtl. Int’l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[P]rosecution
history estoppel can occur during prosecution in one of two ways, either (1) by making a narrowing
amendment to the claim (‘amendment-based estoppel’) or (2) by surrendering claim scope through argument
to the patent examiner (‘argument-based estoppel’).”).
168 504 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
169 ACE (Angiotensin Converting Enzyme) inhibitors are a class of drugs that mediate the reninangiotensin-aldosterone system, which is responsible for regulating blood pressure, water balance, kidney
function, and inflammation. The drug is widely used to treat hypertension, cardiovascular disease, and kidney
disease. See, e.g., Michael W. Tempelhof, Comparative Role of Angiotensin Receptor Blockers Versus Other
Agents in the Management of Hypertension, Cardiovascular Disease and Nephropathy, 102 S. MED. J. 1201
(2009) (comparing ACE inhibitors with other hypertension treatment agents).
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remove certain types of metal-containing stabilizers.170 This narrowing
amendment was not sufficient to constitute argument-based estoppel;171
however, the courts nevertheless determined that amendment-based estoppel
prevented the patentee from later claiming as an equivalent a drug that used
magnesium oxide as a stabilizer.172
Although not a true biologics case, Schwarz Pharma is nevertheless
relevant to this discussion because the accused infringer was a follow-on drug
company that had developed a generic version of a pioneer drug through the
abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) process delineated by the Hatch–
Waxman Act.173 Like the drug in Schwarz Pharma, most follow-on drugs can
be expected to differ from their pioneer drug cousins only in minor ways.174
Allowing the doctrine of equivalents unrestrained coverage of such follow-on
drugs would arguably usurp the whole function of Hatch–Waxman, which is to
encourage the development of low-cost versions of popular pioneer drugs;
accordingly, prosecution history estoppel becomes an important tool for
preventing this.175 With the passage of the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act,176 application of the doctrine of equivalents will likely become
even more problematic, and the use of prosecution history estoppel to temper
the reach of the doctrine of equivalents all the more necessary.177
Prosecution history estoppel also prevented a patentee from claiming
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in Mycogen Plant Science, Inc.
v. Monsanto Co.178 This case involved a patent for synthetic pesticide genes
designed to be expressed in plants, which would then secrete the gene products

170

Schwarz Pharma, 504 F.3d at 1373.
Id.
172 Id. at 1375–78.
173 Id. at 1372.
174 See Sahr, supra note 14, at 45–47 (discussing “design-around” biologics).
175 See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text; see also Meurer & Nard, supra note 112, at 1954
(arguing that the doctrine of equivalents undermines the notice function of patents, with the result that
“[p]otential competitors have a difficult time competing aggressively by using technology that is adjacent to
the technology controlled by the patent owner”).
176 See supra notes 10–13.
177 See supra Parts II, III.
178 91 F. App’x 666 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In this unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit affirmed its previous holding in Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2001), where it rejected Mycogen’s claims of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because of
prosecution history estoppel. The court was forced to reexamine this previous holding in light of the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Festo, which held that prosecution history estoppel created a rebuttable presumption against
the use of the doctrine of equivalents, rather than a complete bar. Mycogen Plant Sci., 91 F. App’x at 668–69.
171
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as a sort of continuous insecticide.179 Monsanto developed its own versions of
the patented genes, which contained significantly different genetic sequences
than Mycogen’s.180 The Federal Circuit held that claim cancellations made by
Mycogen during prosecution that replaced a broad DNA sequence claim with a
narrower sequence claim prevented it from asserting that Monsanto’s versions
infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.181 The court rejected Mycogen’s
argument that although it abandoned claims that covered certain similar gene
sequences, the possibility of dissimilar gene sequences that still functioned as
pesticides was unforeseeable, noting that at one point, “Mycogen originally
attempted to claim all functionally equivalent genes.”182
Mycogen is a textbook illustration of the need to dampen the reach of the
doctrine of equivalents in some biologics cases. The facts of the case closely
parallel the examples given in Part II, above, illustrating the difficulty of
determining the appropriate scope of the doctrine when applied to DNA
sequences.183 Prosecution history estoppel spared the Mycogen court the
difficulty of making such a determination because of clear evidence that the
patentee had failed during prosecution to obtain coverage for all functional
equivalents of its patented gene.184 Although prosecution history estoppel will
not prove applicable to every case involving patented gene sequences, in
similar situations it should prove a valuable method for preventing the use of
the doctrine of equivalents to unduly broaden the scope of biologics patents.185
2. The All Limitations Rule
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court was careful to explain that when
applying the doctrine of equivalents, courts should be careful not to allow
“such broad play as to effectively eliminate [an] element in its entirety.”186 In
other words, although it may sometimes be appropriate for the doctrine to
broaden the scope of patent claims, the doctrine should not be applied if the

179

Id. at 666–67.
Id. at 667.
181 Mycogen Plant Sci., 252 F.3d 1306, 1319–20 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
182 Mycogen Plant Sci., 91 F. App’x at 667–69. The court similarly rejected arguments by Mycogen that
the claim cancellations were merely “tangential” to patentability and that, in the alternative, it should not have
“reasonably be[en] expected” to have described the equivalent in question. Id. at 669.
183 See supra Part II.
184 Mycogen Plant Sci., 91 F. App’x at 668.
185 Although the Mycogen case dealt with DNA sequences, one can easily imagine a similar application of
prosecution history estoppel in cases involving RNA or protein sequences.
186 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
180
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result would be simply to write out a claim in its entirety. Although this
limitation on the doctrine of equivalents can be difficult to apply in practice,187
the Federal Circuit has used it in recent cases to limit application of the
doctrine of equivalents in a biologics context.
For example, in Cook Biotech Inc. v. ACell, Inc., owners of a patent
covering tissue compositions used as scaffolding for tissue reconstruction
argued that a competitor’s composition infringed under the doctrine of
equivalents.188 The patentee cited evidence showing that the accused
infringing composition was equivalent to its patented composition, even
though the infringing composition included two additional tissue layer types.189
The Federal Circuit, however, refused to apply the doctrine because the
plaintiff-patentee’s claims had specifically mentioned a delamination step,
which necessarily removed the tissue types in question.190 Accordingly,
application of the doctrine of equivalents in this case violated the all
limitations rule because it would have completely vitiated the requirement that
the composition be delaminated.191
In Carnegie Mellon University v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., another case
applying the all elements rule in a biologics context, the issue was a patent
describing recombinant plasmids designed to express enzymes known as DNA
Specifically, the patent in question covered a DNA
polymerases.192
polymerase produced from a DNA coding sequence derived from the E. coli
bacterium, while the accused infringing sequence was derived from the
T. aquaticus bacterium.193 Rejecting the patentee’s arguments that the accused
infringing sequence infringed under the doctrine of equivalents, the court held
that “[t]o find otherwise would require this Court to eliminate the E. coli
limitations from the ’745 patent, which under Warner-Jenkinson, this Court
cannot do.”194

187 See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 54, at 380–82 (describing the all limitations rule as lacking “workable
limits” and positing that, “taken to an extreme, application of the vitiation doctrine itself vitiates the doctrine of
equivalents”).
188 460 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
189 Id. at 1379.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 No. C 01-0415 SI, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4975 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2004), aff’d, 541 F.3d 1115 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
193 Id. at *13–14.
194 Id. at *21.

WHITE GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

4/5/2011 10:53 AM

THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

785

As with prosecution history estoppel, the all limitations rule allowed the
courts in the above instances to prevent biologics patents from becoming
overly broadened by the doctrine of equivalents. Although, when considered
in the abstract, the two cases may seem to be rather dry exercises in legal
semantics, in reality the rulings helped to preserve vital biologics innovation
that would otherwise have been stifled. In Cook Biotech, the accused infringer
attempted to license technology from the patent holder but was unsuccessful,195
further illustrating the inadequacy of licensing as a remedy for patent disputes
in the field of biologics;196 the court’s use of the all limitations rule to constrain
the reach of the doctrine of equivalents thus resulted in preservation of the
defendant’s avenue of research. Similarly, although the court in Carnegie
Mellon was on the surface confronted with simple distinctions between DNA
polymerases produced by two different bacterial sources, the ultimate issue in
the case was ownership of the rights to Taq polymerase, which is the key
enzymatic ingredient in the polymerase chain reaction (PCR), a biologics tool
that has found almost ubiquitous application in science, medicine, and law
enforcement over the past few decades.197 Accordingly, using the all
limitations rule, the courts prevented the holder of a distantly related patent
from tying up the rights to one of the most important biologics discoveries of
the past twenty-five years.
B. Breaking the “Black Box”—Expert Juries
The preceding suggestions have focused solely upon judicial remedies.
Given the difficulties that juries often have in dealing with cases involving
complex technologies, such as those found in the biologics arena,198 it is
perhaps unsurprising that many potential solutions to the issue of applying the
doctrine of equivalents to an increasingly complicated world of biologics
195
196
197

Cook Biotech, 460 F.3d at 1369.
See supra Part III.C.
Indeed, as the Federal Circuit noted:
[A]s Roche states in its briefs, that Taq DNA polymerase was and continues to be integral to the
success of polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”), a widely used technique in molecular biology that
was invented by Kary Mullis in 1983. Indeed, in 1993, Mullis won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry
for his development of PCR and the journal Science named Taq DNA polymerase the “Molecule
of the Year.” While we reach our decision irrespective of those facts, we readily can see why
appellants have attempted to broaden the scope of their claims beyond the E. coli species
disclosed.

Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1129 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis
added).
198 See supra Part III.A.
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patents would focus on taking such questions out of the hands of the jury.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson specifically acknowledged the
problems posed by “black-box jury verdicts,” and suggested that these issues
could be at least partially alleviated by summary judgment with respect to the
previously outlined judicial limitations on the doctrine of equivalents, leaving
“no further material issue for the jury to resolve.”199 Defendants in patent
litigation may be particularly reluctant to try a case in front of a jury, as juries
tend to favor patent holders in such disputes.200 However, to limit any analysis
of legal issues to judicial remedies is to ignore the jury half of the equation,
and in any event many disputes involving the doctrine of equivalents in the
biologics arena will not prove amenable to judicial “quick fixes.”201
And perhaps patent professionals should not be so intent upon finding a
summary judgment quick fix in the first place. For one thing, the attitude that
jurors simply do not have the capacity to participate in complex litigation
could be considered arrogant and paternalistic at best, naive and misinformed
at worst.202 Additionally, although summary judgment is now the most likely
method of disposition for patent cases,203 it was once considered inappropriate
for patent cases precisely because of the complexity inherent in most patent
disputes.204 As more and more patent litigators attempt to avoid the jury
“black box” by filing for summary judgment, courts have become flooded with
lengthy and detailed motions.205 As a result, summary judgment motions,
which were once thought to alleviate judicial strain, end up tying up the courts
in protracted motions practice.206 In any event, as the ultimate finders of fact,
199

Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997).
See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box,
99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 408 (2000). After a statistical analysis of all patent cases from 1983 to 1999, thenProfessor Moore concluded that “[p]atent holders have been more successful in jury trials than in bench trials.
Juries find for the patent holder more often on validity, infringement, and willfulness issues and they do award
higher damages.” Id.
201 For example, 2.2% of the 13.5% of 2006 patent cases reaching adjudication were decided by jury
verdict, the second highest subset after summary judgment, which decided 7.0% of cases reaching
adjudication. Paul M. Janicke, Patent Jury Verdicts: Myths and Realities, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, July 2007, at
18, 18 tbl.1.
202 One patent practitioner opines: “The hubris of lawyers is remarkable. We see examples of human skill
and intelligence every day, but we still think that the ordinary person is too dumb to figure out what we
lawyers can understand because of our education and special intelligence.” Joseph N. Hosteny, About
Summary Judgments, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Apr. 2003, at 20, 20.
203 See supra note 201.
204 Joseph N. Hosteny, My Wishes for 2007 (pt. 1), INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Feb. 2007, at 22, 22.
205 See id.
206 Id. It is also important to remember that judges are human, and the overwhelming amount of data that
is presented to the courts through protracted summary judgment proceedings makes it even more difficult for
200
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juries are the final arbiters in many questions involving the doctrine of
equivalents. Accordingly, solutions to the problem of jury confusion hinge
upon impaneling juries that are more capable of rendering decisions in areas of
patent law that, like the biologics arena, involve complex, difficult-tounderstand technologies.
A solution can be found in the use of expert juries to decide technically
challenging cases such as biologics patent disputes.207 The use of expert juries
is rooted in English common law. Originally, juries in England were often
selected for their special knowledge of the issues at trial.208 However, over
time the use of expert juries in England declined, until the practice was largely
abolished in 1949.209 In the United States, expert juries were provided for by

judges to properly resolve patent disputes. As one judge noted, “You can file a brief of whatever length you
want, but I have to tell you, I begin to lose interest after fifteen pages or so.” Hosteny, supra note 202, at 21
(quoting Judge Hubert Will of the Northern District of Illinois) (internal quotation marks omitted).
207 It should be noted that proposals also exist to bring the experience of expert courts to bear upon the
problems of complex litigation. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the only appeals court
with jurisdiction that is defined by specific subject matter (namely, patent disputes), was established by the
Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1982, with the explicit hopes that it would be an expert court that could
bring uniformity and order to the field of patent law. See John B. Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of
International Trade Be Given Patent Jurisdiction Concurrent with That of the District Courts?, 32 HOUS. L.
REV. 67, 85–87 (1995) (describing the reasons behind the creation of the Federal Circuit and arguing that the
U.S. Court of International Trade also be given patent jurisdiction). Patent litigators are extremely selective
with respect to venue choice, and although the motivation behind choosing a particular venue is often based
upon whether plaintiffs or defendants are typically thought to be favored in that jurisdiction, patent litigators
often choose venues that are presided over by judges with experience in trying patent cases. See Anat Hakim
et al., Western District of Wisconsin Court Proves a Speedy and Affordable Venue for Patent Litigation,
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2001, at 34, 34 (citing “the speed of the [court’s] docket,” reasonable expenses,
and proximity to a highly educated jury pool as reasons for the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin’s popularity among patent litigators). Finally, an ongoing pilot program has been developed to
allow patent cases to be swapped from courts that would rather not entertain them with those that would.
Although the program is still in its early stages, it is hoped that this particular program will lead to increased
unity and predictability in complex patent cases. See Donna M. Gitter, Should the United States Designate
Specialist Patent Trial Judges? An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 628 in Light of the English Experience and the
Work of Professor Moore, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 169, 172–73 (2009) (expressing the hope that the
proposed plan will “reduce the appellate claim construction reversal rate, thereby affording needed certainty to
U.S. inventors and investors who require stability in the U.S. patent litigation process”). But see Nancy Olson,
Does Practice Make Perfect? An Examination of Congress’s Proposed District Court Patent Pilot Program,
55 UCLA L. REV. 745 (2008) (citing statistical data regarding reversal rates following claim construction at
the district court level as demonstrating no link between judicial experience with patent cases and affirmance
of claim construction rulings).
208 See James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 139 (1983) (“[I]n cases
of national importance, grand juries often consisted of leading citizens. . . . [Meanwhile, j]uries of experts
ranged from panels of cooks and fishmongers to the all-female jury impaneled to ascertain whether a female
defendant was pregnant.” (footnote omitted)).
209 Id. at 210.
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statute in many states by the first part of the twentieth century.210 However, as
in England, the use of such juries declined in the latter half of that century,211
and currently only Delaware has statutory provisions for impaneling special
juries.212
Other commentators have advocated the use of such juries in litigation
involving complex medical and technological issues.213 Rules allowing courts
to impanel expert juries for patent cases that, like those involving biologics,
deal with scientifically demanding subject matter could alleviate concerns of
the “black box” jury. Such expert juries would be screened during the
selection process for the educational background214 or technical experience215
sufficient for understanding the issues at trial.216
The use of expert juries would help alleviate the fears of patentees and
defendants alike. Parties to complex biologics litigation could be reassured
that such juries would not decide cases on a whim or predilection after
listening to hours of detailed expert testimony that jurors never understood in
the first place.217 These juries would be less likely to simply identify with the
210

See Feigenbaum, supra note 90 (discussing the history of expert juries in the United States).
Id. at 1399.
212 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4506 (2010) (“The Court may order a special jury upon application of any
party in a complex civil case. The party applying for a special jury shall pay the expense incurred by having a
special jury, which may be allowed as part of the costs of the case.”).
213 Feigenbaum, supra note 90 (discussing the history of expert juries in the United States and advocating
the use of special juries as a way to deter spurious medical malpractice claims).
214 See William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury
Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV. 887, 900
(1981) (arguing for modified jury selection procedures that are “keyed to educational background” for
technically complex civil cases).
215 See Kristy Lee Bertelsen, From Specialized Courts to Specialized Juries: Calling for Professional
Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 15 (1998) (arguing that for complex
litigation, impaneling “professional juries would alleviate poor decision making and erratic verdicts by
ensuring that competent individuals, who are familiar with the subject matter of the litigation, render
decisions”).
216 See Beth Z. Shaw, Judging Juries: Evaluating Renewed Proposals for Specialized Juries from a Public
Choice Perspective, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3, 6 (analyzing the use of specialized juries through public
choice theory and concluding that such juries enjoy streamlined deliberations due to “uniformity of
information and comprehension”); see also Tony Caliendo, A Proposed Solution to Jury Confusion in Patent
Infringement Cases Involving Means-Plus-Function Claims, 2004 BYU L. REV. 209 (proposing simpler and
more effective jury instructions to aid juries in deciding cases involving the doctrine of equivalents and meansplus-functions claims); Menon, supra note 90, at 298 (arguing that technical issues should be communicated to
juries by persons skilled at relaying complex information to laypersons).
217 Similar to the use of expert juries, some commentators have proposed the use of neutral, courtappointed experts to assist both judge and jury with understanding complex scientific testimony. See, e.g.,
Samuel H. Jackson, Technical Advisors Deserve Equal Billing with Court Appointed Experts in Novel and
211
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patent holder in cases involving the doctrine of equivalents218 and as a result
would be more likely to apply the doctrine of equivalents in ways that would at
least somewhat alleviate concerns related to unjustified broadening of patent
protections in the field of biologics.
C. Denying Preliminary Injunctions as a Remedy in Biologics Cases Involving
the Doctrine of Equivalents
Licensing can provide an attractive solution to patent disputes. If the terms
of a suitable license can be negotiated between the patentee and the accused
infringer, both parties can end up with a net gain, as the accused infringer is
able to practice the disputed invention without further concerns over legal
consequences, and the patentee is justly compensated for the use of its
intellectual property.219 Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, parties are
often unable to agree on a licensing option to resolve disputes involving
biologics patents, especially when the doctrine of equivalents is involved.220
Absent options to license, a biologics innovator that is uncertain as to whether
its invention infringes an existing biologics patent under the doctrine of
equivalents faces the difficult choice between either abandoning its invention
or subjecting itself to the possibility of an infringement suit. One way of
avoiding this dilemma is for courts to refuse to award permanent injunctions in
biologics disputes involving the doctrine of equivalents. This would
essentially limit the patentee’s remedy to damages, reasonable royalties, or
some combination of both. The accused infringer, upon paying the remedy,
would be free to make, use, sell, or offer to sell the infringing biologic.221 In
other words, this solution would effectively make licensing compulsory in such
cases.
Patents are ownership rights. Such rights can be enforced through property
rules (injunctions) or liability rules (damages).222 Assuming a goal of

Complex Scientific Cases: Does the Federal Judicial Center Agree?, 28 ENVTL. L. 431, 465, 443 (1998)
(arguing that such experts would be “valuable tools for deciphering novel, complex scientific theories” and
would help resolve the issue of the “battle of the experts”).
218 See Moore, supra note 200, at 385–90 (providing a statistical analysis comparing patent litigation
outcomes decided by judges to those decided by juries).
219 See supra Part III.C.
220 Id.
221 All other remedies, such as lost profits and other damages, including enhanced damages in cases of
willful infringement, would still be available to the patentee. See discussion infra note 241.
222 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 68–69 (7th ed. 2007) (discussing property
versus liability rules).
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allocating these rights in such a way as to maximize the value of their use,
when transaction costs are high the most efficient way to protect such rights is
through a denial of injunctive relief, which limits the owners of the rights to
damages.223 In cases involving biologics, transaction costs involved in
licensing technology are typically high, and are often insurmountable.224 The
doctrine of equivalents, which creates uncertainty regarding the scope of patent
rights, further exacerbates these transaction costs.225 Accordingly, to ensure
that the public’s interest in lifesaving biologics innovation is served, injunctive
relief should be denied in cases involving the doctrine of equivalents in a
biologics context.
This can be a troubling idea. People are conditioned to take it for granted
that ownership should be enforced through property rules—after all, if a party
owns property, most would feel that other parties should be enjoined from
using that property without the owner’s permission. In actuality, this is not
(and should not be) always the case, as is illustrated, for example, by the
textbook cases involving industrial polluters versus residential homeowners.226
Of course, the government itself has the ability to appropriate through
compulsory licenses real property (through eminent domain),227 intellectual
property,228 emergency foodstuffs,229 nuclear technology,230 weapon
systems,231 and pollution control measures.232 Additionally, courts have long
223 Id. (“In conflicting-use situations in which transaction costs are high, the allocation of resources to
their most valuable uses is facilitated by denying owners of property an injunctive remedy against invasions of
their rights and instead limiting them to a remedy in damages . . . .”); see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089 (1972) (discussing further the differences between property and liability rules).
224 This is one reason for the failure of voluntary licensing to address ownership issues in the field of
biologics. See supra Part III.C.
225 See supra note 119.
226 See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in
Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 442 (1995) (discussing the property and liability rule theories advanced
by Calabresi and Melamed and noting that “[t]he problem of environmental pollution is the stock example”).
227 Perhaps the most famous recent Supreme Court case dealing with the question of eminent domain is
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), a decision that generated a firestorm of controversy and
prompted a Los Angeles businessman to attempt to convince the town of Weare, New Hampshire, to use
eminent domain to acquire property owned by Justice Souter for development of a new hotel. See Dan
Glaister, Activists Take Campaign to Top Judge’s Elegant Domain, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 23, 2006, at 18.
228 Federal law grants the federal government the right to use or manufacture any patented invention, or
license such use of manufacture to a third party, with the remedy to the patentee limited to “reasonable and
entire compensation for such use and manufacture.” 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006).
229 Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2006).
230 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2006).
231 35 U.S.C. §§ 181–183 (2006).
232 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2006).
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held equitable discretion over the granting or denial of injunctive relief (and
thus the choice between property and liability rules) in civil cases, and the
Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., recently stressed this
fact.233 Finally, much of the research in the biologics and pharmaceutical
fields originates in public universities that receive significant federal funding,
which further validates the public’s interest in receiving the benefits of
lifesaving technologies that are often made possible through its tax dollars.234
Denial of injunctive relief in patent disputes has been proposed as a
solution for maximizing the public benefit of medical technologies in an age of
global terrorism,235 improving global access to medications for addressing
serious public health needs including AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, cancer, and
heart disease,236 and preventing an “anticommons” with respect to patents on
human DNA sequences.237 Other commentators have argued for a less drastic
use of compulsory licenses. One attractive modification to the general
compulsory license strategy is the use of “time-varying compulsory licenses,”
which are compulsory licenses with rates that increase over time.238 Use of
these types of licenses would prevent a patentee from stifling valuable
innovations while also encouraging the infringing party to quickly develop
non-infringing versions of its infringing products.239 Other proposals have
limited denials of injunctive relief to patent disputes involving the doctrine of
equivalents, and even in those instances on a case-by-case basis.240 At the very

233 See 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006) (“[T]his Court has consistently rejected invitations to replace
traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a
copyright has been infringed.”). But see Michael C. Brandt, Compulsory Licenses in the Aftermath of eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.: The Courts’ Authority to Impose Prospective Compensatory Relief for Patent
Infringement, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 699 (2008) (arguing that the eBay decision should not be read as altering
available patent remedies and that policy concerns mediate against compulsory licenses).
234 See, e.g., Eileen M. Kane, Molecules and Conflict: Cancer, Patients, and Women’s Health, 15 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 305, 317–18 (2007) (arguing that the public interest should be a key factor in
questions of ownership of federally funded technologies).
235 Grace K. Avedissian, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift Toward Compulsory
Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of “Super-Terrorism,” 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237 (2002).
236 Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International
Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193 (2005).
237 Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States
and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1623 (2001).
238 Eric Keller, Time-Varying Compulsory License: Facilitating License Negotiation for Efficient PostVerdict Patent Infringement, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 427, 441 (2008).
239 Id.
240 See Holbrook, supra note 119 (arguing that preclusion of injunctive relief for infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents would in many instances ameliorate the resultant uncertainty in claim scope).
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least, injunctive relief should certainly be denied in biologics cases involving
the doctrine of equivalents for all of the reasons discussed previously: the
difficulties inherent in applying the doctrine in a biologics context; the highly
technical nature of the issues involved, which may be confusing for lay jurors;
the potential for the doctrine to stifle biologics innovation (and the concomitant
failure of voluntary licensing to remedy this); and the overriding public interest
in furthering innovation and access to lifesaving and life-changing biologic
pharmaceuticals.241
It could be argued that a weakness in such a proposal would be the
difficulty in determining a fair licensing fee for the patentee. However, “courts
routinely are involved in assessing royalty rates and remedies in patent
cases,”242 and caselaw provides substantial guidance as to what actually
constitutes a reasonable royalty.243 It could also prove difficult to determine
just what qualifies as a biologic in the first place;244 a (perhaps too) simple
remedy to this definitional quandary would be to limit the “biologics” class to
those products that are so defined by the FDA,245 or in future “pathways to
biologics” legislation.246 This proposal would also have the added benefit of
reducing the amount of complicated patent litigation pending before courts, as
biologics patentees whose infringement cases depended upon the doctrine of
equivalents would be more likely to negotiate licenses if denied injunctive
relief, while both patentees and accused infringers would have an incentive to
avoid litigation costs and reach licensing agreements without facing the
uncertainty of court-mandated licensing terms.247 The reduction in litigation
would benefit the public by both freeing up expensive, publicly funded judicial

241 It is important to emphasize that this proposal would echo Professor Holbrook’s in preserving “[t]he
full panoply of remedies for literal infringement,” while “[l]ost profits and other damages would remain
available” for both literal infringement and cases involving the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 46.
242 Id. at 47–48.
243 For example, many courts, including the Federal Circuit, ascribe to the four-factor Panduit test for
determining reasonable royalties, which analyzes (1) the demand for the patented good, (2) the absence in the
market of acceptable non-infringing substitutes, (3) the ability of the patentee to exploit such demand through
manufacturing and marketing capabilities, and (4) the profit the patentee would otherwise have made. Panduit
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).
244 See Rader, supra note 8 (observing that defining biologics as a class of pharmaceuticals can be a
difficult proposition).
245 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
246 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
247 This addresses one of the biggest arguments in favor of property rules over liability rules, namely that
interested parties “can establish the relevant values by bargaining more cheaply and more accurately than can
the judge weighing the evidence.” James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules:
The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 450 (1995).
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resources and also, hopefully, contributing to lower prices for biologic
pharmaceuticals, as less money would be wasted in litigation by biologics
firms. To prevent follow-on innovators from attempting to “game” the system
by willfully infringing and counting on the courts to set a better royalty rate
than could otherwise have been negotiated, damages for willful infringement in
cases involving the doctrine of equivalents in a biologics context, currently at
the court’s discretion, could be set by statute at triple base damages. All
remedies other than injunctive relief would remain available to a patent holder,
including damages, lost profits, and costs.248
This proposal results in more desirable outcomes when applied to cases like
Boehringer and Cook Biotech. In Boehringer, the lack of an injunctive remedy
would deny the patentee the ability to keep the infringer from producing and
selling its improved vaccine, thus improving the health of commercial pig
herds and providing substantial public benefit. The patentee would still be left
with reasonable royalty revenues secured by a license, which under this
proposal would in all likelihood have been negotiated without the need for the
interested parties to waste time and resources on a trial. In Cook Biotech, the
parties wound up in litigation after the accused infringer tried and failed to
license scaffolding technology from the patentee.249 Under this proposal, such
litigation would never have taken place, because without the possibility of
winning injunctive relief, the patentee would have no incentive to deny
granting a (reasonable) license in the first place.
This proposal is superior to judicial limitations on the doctrine of
equivalents or the impaneling of expert juries to hear complex biologics cases.
Unlike those remedies, this proposal would come into play after a verdict has
been rendered, meaning that it is available even when judicial restraints on the
doctrine of equivalents, like prosecution history estoppel or the all limitations
rule, do not apply, and would somewhat ameliorate the fallout of poor verdicts
delivered by overwhelmed juries. Additionally, the denial of a permanent
injunction would provide a meaningful threat that would deter litigation and
encourage licensing in the first place. Denying injunctive relief in cases
involving the doctrine of equivalents in a biologics context strikes an
appropriate balance between providing compensation to patentees for the use
of valuable intellectual property rights while still allowing innovator firms to

248
249

See supra note 241.
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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bring less costly and more effective versions of biologic pharmaceuticals to
market.
CONCLUSION
The rapidly evolving arena of biologic pharmaceuticals will revolutionize
medicine and enhance the quality of life for millions of persons. However, the
exquisite complexity that makes biologic treatments so amenable to previously
untreatable disorders also creates difficulties in the field of patent law,
particularly with respect to such ephemeral concepts as the doctrine of
equivalents, difficulties that are highlighted by cases such as Boehringer and
Goldenberg. There is considerable evidence that juries have difficulty dealing
with cases involving technologically advanced subject matter of the type that is
often at issue in biologics cases. These factors lead to uncertainty as to the
limits of biologic patents, which carries with it the potential to chill vital
biologics innovation in a way that cannot be overcome by such remedies as
cross-licensing.
To address these problems, courts should be prepared to exert their legal
prerogatives over the doctrine of equivalents in biologics cases, including
rigorous application of both prosecution history estoppel and the all limitations
rule. Additionally, the impaneling of expert juries that are better able to
understand the complex, far-reaching issues involved in such cases, which
often have policy ramifications that go well beyond the resolution of the
particular case at bar, can also provide more certainty and predictability in
cases involving the doctrine of equivalents in a biologics context. Finally, the
denial of injunctive relief in biologics cases where infringement is found under
the doctrine of equivalents provides fairness and a preservation of incentives
for biologics patent holders while preventing the development of a “patent
thicket” in the biologics arena, allowing follow-on innovators to bring vital
new biologic therapeutics to the public. In any event, courts should exercise
caution when applying the doctrine of equivalents in a biologics context to
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ensure that its legitimate function of protecting patent holders from
“unscrupulous copyists” can be reconciled with the preservation of innovation
in the field of biologic pharmaceuticals.
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